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UNIONS AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR:
A STUDY OF MUNICIPAL LIBRARIES
RONALD G. EHRENBERG, DANIEL R. SHERMAN,
and JOSHUA L. SCHWARZ*
This lapercdev'elopDsan illustrates the use of two methodologies to analyze
the effect of unions on productivity in the public sector. Although the
mtlodologies ate applicable to a wide vatriet' of l)tblic sector functions, the
foctts of the paper is on municipal libraries because of the availability of rele-
vant data. The empirical analysis, which uses 1977 cross-sechion data on 260
liltrari's. suggests that collective bargaining coverage has not significantly
afftcted prodtuctisvity in imunicipal libraries.
TlE. traditional neoclassical view ofunions asserts that although unions
may benefit their nembers by creating non-
compensating wage differentials, they also
cause allocative efficiency losses and thus
have a negative impact on the economy as
a whole. Recently, however, this view has
been challenged by Richard Freeman, J ames
Medoff, and their associates at Harvard.'
Drawing on hypotheses put forth long ago
by institutional economists, they have
argued that unions may vell increase pro-
dLuctivity in a number of ways: by reducing
*Ronald Ehrenberg is a professor of economics and
labor economics at Cornell University and a research
associate at the National Buteati of Economic
Research. Daniel Sherman and Joshua Schwarz ae
graduate students at the New York State School of In-
dustrial and Labot Relations. Cornell University. T his
lesearch Nvas stupported by the National Science Folin-
dation. An earlier vetsion of the paper wsas piesented at
the Winter 1981 Econornettic Society meetings.
Without implicating them fot wvhat remains, the
atlIots are giateft Ito Dani el iiametrmesh atid the dis-
cutssanits at those meetings for theit comments on earlier
draIfts.
'A good, nontechnical treatment of their views is
found in Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff,
"The Two Faces of Unionism," Public Interest, No.57
(Fall 1979), pp. 69-93.
turnover, increasing morale and motiv'a-
tion. and expanding formal and informal
on-the-job training. Indeed, several of these
scholars' econometric studies suggest that
union/nonunion productivity differentials
in the private sector are often positive.2
To the extent that these results are general-
izable, one Must question whether unions
in the private sector have actually had net
adverse effects on efficiency.
No research, however, has been directed
towaird ascertaining the effect of unions on
productivity in the public sector. This
2See, for example, Charles Brown and James L.
Medoff, ''Trade Unions in the Production Process,"
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 86, No. 3 (June
1978), pp. 355-78, for evidence on manufacturing;
Kim B. Clark, ''The Impact of Unionization on Pro-
ductivity: A Case Study," Industrial and Labor Rela-
tions Review, Vol. 33. No. 4 (July 1980). pp. 451-69.
for evidence on the cement industry; and Steven G.
Allen, "Unionized Construction Workets are Moie
Productive." mimeograph (Washington, D.C.: Cen-
ter to Protect Worker Rights, 1979) for evidence on
construction. Lest one conclude that these researchers
always find that unions increase productivity in the
private sector, see Marie Connerton, Richard B. Free-
man, and James L. Medoff, "Productivity and Indus-
trial Relations: The Case of Bituminous Coal." un-
published mimeograph (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University, 1979).
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neglect is understandable, since the con-
cepts of output and productivity in the
public sector are often not well defined,
and the difficulties inherent in trying to
measure productivity are consequently
large. Nevertheless, the growing financial
difficulties of state and local governments
suggest that this important problem can no
longer be ignored. Most studies of public
sector wage determination have indicated
that unions have had only modest effects
on their members' compensation;3 studies
of public-employee unions' effects on pro-
ductivity are now required to complete
our understanding of the effects these
unions have had on municipal finances
and service flows.
This paper therefore develops, and illus-
trates the use of, methodologies to analyze
the effects of unions on productivity in the
public sector. The methodologies discussed
can be applied to a wide variety of public
sector functions such as education, police,
fire protection, and sanitation; but the focus
here is on municipal libraries. This focus
was chosen in part for expository reasons,
since considerable effort has been devoted
to conceptualizing productivity measures
for libraries, and in part because relevant
data are available for libraries.' Thus, al-
though the issue of productivity in muni-
3See, for example, Orley Ashenfelter, "The Effect
of Unionization on Wages in the Public Sector: The
Case of Firefighters," Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, Vol. 24, No. 2 (January 1971), pp. 191 - 202;
Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Gerald S. Goldstein, "A
Model of Public Sector Wage Determination," jour-
nal of Urban Economics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (July 1975), pp.
223- 45; and Hirschel Kasper, "The Effects of Collec-
tive Bargaining on Public School Teachers' Salaries,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 24, No. I
(October 1970), pp. 57-72.4For previous discussions of library productivity,
including its quality dimension, see Malcolm Getz,
Public Libraries: An Economic View (Baltimore,
Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); Karen
Feldstein, The Economics of Public Libraries, un-
published Ph.D. dissertation (Cambridge, Mass.:
Massachusetis Institute of Technology, 1977); F. W.
Lancaster, The Measurement and Evaluation of
Library Services (Washington, D.C.: Information
Resources Press, 1977); and Ernst R. DeProspo, Ellen
Altman, and Kenneth E. Beasley, Performance Mea-
sures for Public Libraries (Chicago, Ill.: Public
Library Association, 1973).
cipal libraries is important in its own right,
we would stress the more general purpose of
the paper.
Analytic Framework
Municipal libraries produce a variety of
outputs, such as circulating books, periodi-
cals, and other audio-visual materials; re-
sponding to requests for information and
interlibrary loans; and providing reference
facilities. These outputs can, in theory, be
evaluated both quantitatively and quali-
tatively. One could, for example, simply
count circulation figures or the number of
information requests, but a more sophis-
ticated valuation of library output would
focus on such questions as "What propor-
tion of information requests were answered
correctly?" or "How long did the typical
borrower have to wait for a book that he or
she wanted?"
For now, we shall ignore the fact that
libraries can be thought of as multiproduct
firms, and throughout the paper, because
of data limitations, we are forced to ignore
the quality dimension of the services librar-
ies provide. Instead, we treat library output
(Q) as a single variable. The community
demand function for library services can
then be specified as:
D = D(P V,, V).
Here, P is the "price" the community
must pay for a unit of library services; other
things equal, the higher the price, the fewer
the library services demanded. The position
of the demand curve will depend on both
community income or wealth, with higher
income areas demanding more library ser-
Vices, and on the size of the community
(V,). It will also depend on the community's
"tastes" for library services (V2). More
highly educated communities, for example,
may demand more library services, as may
communities with a relatively large pro-
portion of school-aged children.
The second element of our model is the
following production function for library
services:
Q - F(K,LI V3,U).
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Here we have treated output, capital (K),
and labor (L) as single variables. The capital
stock includes the library's entire stock of
materials as of the current period. V3 is a
vector representing those community vari-
ables that affect the position or shape of the
production function. One early study, for
example, found that two-thirds to three-
quarters of all library users lived within one
mile of a library.5 This finding suggests
that, other things equal, increases in popu-
lation density, which facilitate locating
branch libraries within a short distance of
all individuals in the community, increases
the flow of library services.
The production function for library
services may also be a function of whether
the library's employees are represented by
a union (U). As noted by Freeman and
Medoff, unionization may increase pro-
ductivity by inducing reductions in turn-
over, increases in morale and motivation,
and increases in formal and informal on-
the-job training. If one examines the kinds
of contract provisions that library unions
have tried to win from municipal employ-
ers, one will recognize many of them as the
"enlightened" personnel practices widely
accepted in the private sector as leading to
increases in productivity. Examples here
include the standardization of entrance
qualifications and examinations, the rec-
ognition of seniority rights, and the policy
of encouraging promotion from within, as
well as the establishment of equal oppor-
tinity and pay for men and women. Of
course, plausible arguments can be made
that some of these provisions, especially
those that limit management flexibility,
may well reduce productivity. The net effect
of these provisions on library productivity is
an open question. 6
5Bernard Berelson, The Library's Public (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1949).
6For a discussion of the ways in which unions may
influence productivity in libraries, see, for example,
Herbert Biblo. "Librarians and Trade Unionism: A
Prologue," and Marilyn A. Oberg, Mary Blackburn,
and Joan Dible, "Unionization: Costs and Benefits to
the Individual and to the Library," both in Margaret
Chaplan, ed., Employee Organization and Collective
Bargaining in Libraries, a special issue of Library
Trends, Vol. 25. No. 2 (October 1976), pp. 4 2 3 - 3 3 and
435- 49, respectively.
In addition, the unionization of library
employees may reduce productivity if it
places limits on library management's
ability to substitute among factors of
production in its decision making or if un-
ionization forces management to devote ad-
ditional resources to contract negotiations
and to the resolution of grievances. Union-
induced increases in labor costs may also
lead to a reduction in the hours that a library
is open, which in turn may reduce library
output, since some potential "customers"
may find their usage of the library restricted
by the reduced hours.' Finally, libraries are
service organizations in which unionized
employees interact directly with library
users to produce library output. To the ex-
tent that unionization influences the nature
of these interactions, library output may be
altered. Of key concern in this analysis is the
net impact of all these effects of unions on
the production function.
A library's stock of capital depends on its
stock of capital in the preceding period
(K-,), its investment in new capital (I),
and the rate at which its previous stock of
capital depreciates ( 8 ). The latter depends
on the age distribution of the library's books
(in the main, books are used most heavily
in the initial years following their pur-
chase) and the resources the library devotes
to maintaining its collection and avoiding
theft. The function for the stock of capital
is thus:
(3) K=I+(1 - S)K_
7Getz, in Public Libraries, pp. 28- 55, ( chapter
2) presents some evidence, for a sample of large muni-
cipal libraries, that increases in laboi costs are asso-
ciated with reductions in hours of library operations
and that reductions in library hours are associated
with lower library circulation per capita. The latter
relationship is not statistically significant, however.
We should note that unions may also affect library
employees' hours of work, as well as the hours of
library operation. If the former occurs, it may distort
the estimates of union effects on annual salaries and
productivity, which are reported in the next section.
We have no data on library employees' hours of work,
and so we do not address this problem in the text.
Our impression, however, is that unions have not
significantly reduced hours of work in the public
sector, except in the case of firefighters. Hence, our
omission of an hours measure is not likely to be a
serious one.
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The costs incurred by a library are pri-
marily for labor, new acquisitions, and
maintaining the library's collection and
buildings. Let W be the cost per unit of
labor. We assume that this cost does not vary
with the number of library employees hired;
that is, the library does not have any monop-
sony power. Let m be the per-unit cost of
maintaining the collection and c the cost of
new materials. The total costs the library
incurs are thus given by:
(4) C= WL + cI + mK_.
To the extent that unions are successful in
increasing their members' wages, of course,
W will be an increasing function of U.
The assumption that cost minimization
occurs in the public sector is sometimes
challenged by those who argue that there
are no natural forces in that sector to en-
courage cost minimization similar to the
competitive pressures on profit-making
firms in the private sector. Given the finan-
cial pressures faced by municipalities since
the mid-1970s, however, many local gov-
ernment officials probably would not sup-
port this challenge; we therefore maintain a
hypothesis of cost minimization.' The
average cost function for library services is
obtained by minimizing costs (Equation 4),
subject to the production-function and
capital-stock constraints (Equations 2 and
3, respectively). The average cost function,
AC, is thus given by the following:
(5) AC = AC(QIW,c,m, V3, 6,K -,F,U).
If the underlying library production func-
tion exhibits constant (decreasing or in-
creasing) returns to scale, average costs will
be constant (increasing with output or de-
creasing with output).
The average cost curve represents the
price to the library of producing different
levels of library services. Given the demand
curve, D, the equilibrium level of library
services, Q*, is assumed to be obtained by
8For a discussion of alternative models of public
sector decision making, see the papers in Daniel S.
Hamermesh, ed., Labor in the Public and Nonprofit
Sectors (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1975).
setting demand equal to average costs. From
Equations 1 and 5, this equilibrium level
can be expressed as the reduced-form equa-
tion:
(6) Q* = G(V,V 2,V 3,W,cm, r6, K -,F,U).
Obviously, any factor that shifts the demand
curve up will increase output, whereas any
factor that shifts the average cost curve up
will reduce output. The important point to
note here is that observed output is deter-
mined by both demand and cost factors.
The effects of unions on service flows
operate via both their effects on wages and
their effects on the production function
(Equation 2). If unions do increase the
wages of library employees, this increase
should shift the average cost curve up and
reduce output. If unions increase (decrease)
the level of output associated with any given
input levels (for the reasons discussed ear-
lier), this change will shift the average cost
curve down (up), thereby increasing (de-
creasing) output.
Equation 6 provides a simple framework
that can be used to estimate the effects of
unions on productivity. If cross-section
data on library services, on the demand and
cost variables, and on unionization can be
obtained, the model can be estimated. The
coefficient of the unionization variable in
this model would represent the net effect of
library unions on productivity. If one were
to estimate Equation 6 without the wage
variable, however, the coefficient of the
unionization variable would capture both
the net effect of unions on the production
function for library services and the effect
of union-induced wage gains on average
costs and, hence, on output. Of course, if
coverage by a collective bargaining agree-
ment is endogenously determined, esti-
mation of Equation 6 by ordinary least
squares would not necessarily lead to con-
sistent estimates of the union effects.
Estimating the Model
In 1977, the International City Manage-
ment Association (ICMA) conducted a sur-
vey of municipal public libraries in cities
with populations of at least 50,000. The
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survey, the results of which were made avail-
able to us by ICMA, collected data on library
revenues and expenditures, employment
and wage scales for different categories of
library employees, the number of books in
each library, and various measures of library
usage, including circulation and the num-
ber of borrowers, information requests, and
interlibrary loans. These data are sup-
plemented here with data on the socio-
economic characteristics of cities, obtained
from the 1977 City and County Databook,
and with data, obtained from a mail survey
by the authors, on whether any library
employees in each municipality were cov-
ered by a collective bargaining agreement
in 1977.
These data permit the estimation of equa-
tions of the following form:
(7) ZKi = K Vjj + "YKUi
+ FKi, where K = 1,2,. . .8,
for a sample of 256 municipal libraries. 9
Equation 7 is a reduced-form version of the
library output equation, Equation 6, de-
rived above. The output measures used are
the number of information requests (Z,),
borrowers (ZV2 ), and interlibrary loans (Z,);
the total circulation (Z4); and book and
periodical circulation (Z)-each expressed
as a per capita measure and in natural
logarithm form. We also use several mea-
sures of service flows per borrower, all in
natural logarithm form: interlibrary loans
per borrower (Z6), total circulation per
borrower (Z7), and book and periodical
circulation per borrower (Z).
Vj represents those variables expected to
influence library output, from either the
demand or the cost sides of the model. The
demand side is represented by a set of vari-
ables assumed to be related to a community's
preference for library services. These vari-
ables include several measures of the age,
race, and sex distributions of the popula-
tion (percentages of the population older
than age eighteen (V,6), older than age
9Some of these data have been published in the
1978 Municipal Yearbook (Washington, D.C.:
International City Management Association, 1978).
The number of observations varies across equations
because of the nonreporting of data.
sixty-five (17), nonwhite (V, 8), and fe-
male (V,,)). We hypothesize, as previous
studies have suggested, that school-aged
children are more likely to use municipal
public libraries, the elderly less likely (be-
cause of health limitations), nonwhites less
likely (because historically they have made
less use of municipal services), and females
more likely (because of lower labor-force
participation rates). Community prefer-
ences for library services are also assumed to
be positively related to the median educa-
tion level in the community (V20) and to
the percentage of employees in the com-
munity who are employed in education
(V2). The community's ability to pay, as
measured by median family income (W2 2),
is also assumed to influence the demand for
library services.
The cost side is captured first by several
organizational variables. Libraries that are
separate municipal departments (V,) may
benefit from being "managed" by muni-
cipal employees whose preoccupation is
solely with. the individual library, whereas
those that are part of a larger library system
(V,,) may benefit from economies of scale
in certain library functions (such as order-
ing). The cost side is also captured by library
volumes per capita (V), which is a proxy
for the lagged capital stock, and by several
demographic variables (city population,
V10; population change, V13 and V14; and
population density, V15). These demo-
graphic variables may reflect economies of
scale (V,()), the depreciation rate of the
stock of library materials W13, V14), or the
cost of providing library services (V,,). l 0
Collective bargaining coverage is cap-
tured by a dichotomous variable, ui, that
'OSeveral weaknesses in our data base should be
apparent. First, we are forced to use the current stock
of library volumes as a proxy for the lagged capital
stock (although preliminary analysis suggests that
omitting this variable does not substantially affect
our results). Second, in the absence of data on the age
distribution of books in a library's collection or data
on the resources devoted to maintenance of the collec-
tion, we use data on the growth rate of population in
the city as a proxy for the depreciation rate of the
collection, assuming that more rapidly growing cities
have "younger" collections. Third, we have no data on
other durable capital inputs, such as the number or
size of library buildings.
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indicates whether any library employees in
the municipality were covered by a collec-
tive bargaining agreement in 1977. Approx-
imately one-third of the libraries in the
sample had some employees covered by an
agreement in 1977.
The structure and scope of collective
bargaining coverage for library employees
is, of course, much more complicated than
this simple dichotomous variable would
suggest." In small cities, library employees
are more likely to belong to unions that also
represent other municipal employees,
whereas in larger cities, library employees
sometimes have their own bargaining units.
Where organized, professional library em-
ployees tend to be included with nonpro-
fessional employees in the same unit, but
sometimes only the nonprofessional em-
ployees are covered by a collective bargain-
ing agreement. Clearly, the structure of col-
lective bargaining influences the effect that
unions have on productivity. Library
unions restricted to professional employees
may well be more concerned with the qual-
ity of services provided than unions re-
stricted to nonprofessional employees or
unions that cover nonlibrary employees
as well. These unions may focus more on
winning improved wages and working
conditions and be less concerned about the
quantity or quality of library services pro-
vided.
Similarly, the ability of a library union to
win contract demands is likely to depend at
least in part on the percentage of library
employees who are unionized, not simply
on whether any employees are covered by a
collective bargaining agreement. Although
it is clear in hindsight that our mail survey
should have sought to obtain more informa-
tion on the structure and scope of collective
bargaining, the survey was unfortunately
restricted to obtaining data on the dichoto-
mous variable, ui.
'Some of the discussion of the structure of collec-
tive bargaining for library employees that follows
is drawn from Theodore L. Guyton, Unionization:
The Viewpoint of Librarians (Chicago, Ill.: American
Library Association, 1975), pp. 36- 45. Guyton's data,
however, are for a period earlier than the one we
analyze.
In this initial specification, we have ex-
cluded library employees' wages from the
right-hand side of Equation 7; later we relax
this restriction. Because of this exclusion,
the coefficients of the unionization variable
will capture the net effects of both collective
bargaining on the production function for
library services and union-induced wage
gains on average costs and, hence, output.'2
Estimates of Equation 7 appear in Table
1.13 In the vector of variables other than
unionization, several of the variables influ-
ence library output in a manner consistent
with our a priori predictions. For example,
whenever the relationships are statistically
significant, increases in the school-aged
population (decreases in V, 6), the aged
population (1/17), median education level
(V2o), the proportion of the population
employed in education (V2), and com-
munity income (V22) all increase various
measures of library output. Some measures
expected to influence output (such as the
proportion of the population that is female,
V,,) are always insignificant, however.
Finally, contrary to our expectations, an
increase in population density (V,,) is
associated with fewer borrowers and smaller
circulation levels, and an increase in the
aged population is associated with higher
circulation levels. 14
12We exclude wages initially because it is likely
that the same forces that influence library employees'
wages also influence library output, and thus the
inclusion of wages on the right-hand side of the
equation would lead to simultaneous-equations bias.
In the absence of a set of variables that can be used to
identify the wage and output equations, one can
think of Equation 7 as a reduced-form equation in
which the coefficient of each explanatory variable,
including unionization, reflects both the variable's
direct effect on output and its indirect effect-the latter
operating through the effect of the variable on wages
and the effect of wages on output.
13The number of observations used to estimate the
equations in Table 1, and Table 2 below, varies be-
tween 161 and 256 due to the nonreporting of data on
the dependent variables. Since most of the estimated
union/nonunion differentials prove to be zero, we do
not worry about whether nonrandom differences in
the various samples affect the pattern of results.
"Getz, in Public Libraries: An Economic View,
pp. 87-93, finds a similar negative relationship be-
tween density and library output in his study of branch
libraries in New York City. He argues that population
density may be a proxy for the rental cost of structures,
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Our primary interest is in the collective
bargaining variable, u. It is strikingly ap-
parent that this variable is insignificantly
related to most of the output measures. Only
interlibrary loans (Z, and Z6) are even mar-
ginally related to the presence of a union, as
municipalities whose library employees
were covered in 1977 by an agreement had,
other things equal, some 33 percent (e2 28 -
1) more interlibrary loans per capita than
municipalities with nonunion libraries. 5
Since such loans are hardly a major func-
tion of municipal libraries, the overall effect
of unions on municipal library output is
quite small.
The coefficients of the collective bargain-
ing variable in Table 1 capture the sum of
the effects of collective bargaining on the
production function for library services and
of the effects of union-induced wage gains
on average costs and, hence, on output.
Estimates of the effect of library employees'
unions on their members' wages are also of
interest in themselves. As noted previously,
other things equal, a union-induced wage
gain will reduce output; thus, if library
unions have raised their members' wages,
the productivity of those employees would
have to have increased to explain the find-
ing in Table 1 that library output is not af-
with more densely populated areas having higher
rental rates. If this relationship does exist, the average
cost of library services may well be higher in those
areas, which would lead to a lower level of library
services. A negative relationship between population
density and library output, therefore, may well be
consistent with our model. The positive relation-
ship between circulation and the proportion of the
population that is aged may reflect the greater leisure
time of this group that is associated with retirement.
15 One might be tempted to argue that this finding
is a statistical artifact of our lumping together in the
sample libraries that are quite heterogeneous in func-
tions. In particular, if central-city libraries with a
large number of volumes per capita (V1 2 ) are primary
suppliers of interlibrary loans and also tend to be
unionized, the unionization variable may at least
partially be capturing the effects of city size and li-
brary type. In an attempt to control for this possi-
bility, we reestimated Equation 7 by restricting the
sample to cities with populations of under 100,000.
Although the statistical significance of the union co-
efficients in the interlibrary-loan equations declined,
the point estimates remained virtually identical to
those reported in Table 1. Thus, this line of explana-
tion does not appear to be correct.
fected by the presence of a union agreement.
Estimates of the determinants of library
employees' wages, based on existing models
of public sector wage determination, are
presented in Table 2 for four categories of
library employees.i 6 Since the demand for
library employees is derived from the de-
mand for library output and since the sup-
ply of potential applicants to the library
also influences public sector wages and
average library costs, the vector of explana-
tory variables in Table 2 is, not surpris-
ingly, identical to that in Table 1.17 What is
remarkable is (1) how poorly library em-
ployees' wages can be explained by these
data (given the success of previous studies of
public sector wage determination) and (2)
the strong indication that collective bar-
gaining has not significantly affected the
wages of library employees.is Given the
results in Table 1, it follows that collective
bargaining in municipal public libraries
has, on average, had no substantial effect on
either the wages or productivity of library
employees.
How sensitive are these findings to the
estimation methods used? Columns 1 of
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the estimated out-
put (Table 1) and wage (Table 2) differ-
entials obtained so far. Columns 2 of these
tables show the estimated differentials that
result from (1) dropping the assumption
that collective bargaining coverage influ-
16See, for example, Ehrenberg and Goldstein,
"A Model of Public Sector Wage Determination."
7An additional variable that should, in principle,
enter only the wage equation is some measure of
wages in occupations that represent possible alterna-
tives for library employees. Proxies for such a mea-
sure-average hourly earnings in manufacturing in
the city and average monthly earnings of municipal
employees in the city-never proved significant.
however, and thus were excluded from the analyses
reported in the text,
"sOur failure to find any significant wage gains
associated with collective bargaining for library
employees may reflect two different kinds of wage
spillover effects. The wages of nonunion library
employees may be affected by the wages of other
municipal employees who are unionized; or their
wages may be affected by the wages of unionized li-
brary employees in other geographic areas. See
Ehrenberg and Goldstein, "A Model of Public Sector
Wage Determination," for a discussion of occupa-
tional and geographic spillovers of union wage gains
in the public sector.
HeinOnline  -- 36 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 206 1982-1983
U
N
IO
N
S A
N
D
 
P
R
O
D
U
C
T
IV
IT
Y
 
IN
 T
H
E
 PU
B
L
IC
 SE
C
T
O
R
tC
 
-
r 
-
t 
-
-
t, 
t-- 
-
C
D
 
m
I0L
*
 
0 
n
C
- 
0
-
-
-
 
C
 
-
0 
0 
-
C
 
-
-
~
 
-
~
 
-
-
-
-
-
7C
C
 70 
C'J 
7- 0 
-
::- 
a 
0 
0 
C-
C
D
- 
C
-I 
C
-f 
0 
=
 
C
 
-
0
clI
-
-
 
-
-
0-0----00 
-
-
-L
 
C 
00 
z
 
0rc 
-
q l-I 
-
n
- 
-n
 
C
D
I 
q
 
S
C
- 
I 
I
0 
-n
 
%
Ic 
C
D
 CD 
m
C
 p 
aC
C
 
0 
-
C
-C
 0 IC
i CC 
0 
C
0 
c-. 
C:I 
C
- 
r
0 
0 
0 
C
 
C 
c
 
m
 ~
c iC 0 
CI
-1 
=
 
.
-
S0If) 
'5 
C
)C
 
-
0 
C
-
-
-
-
-
C
,
SC
 
C-I
-
C-I
0 
CC
N
' 
IC
)
0 
C-I
.2.~ 
C
-
~C 
~
CCCr 
r 
Cr Cr
C
r Cf 
f 
Cr 
<
000000 
-
-
S
. 
5;
-
S
C
 
C~CC
~
*
*
H
einO
nline  -- 36 Indus. &
 Lab. Rel. Rev. 207 1982-1983
INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
Table 3. Estimated Effects of Collective Bargaining Coverage
on the Logarithms of Library Output Measures.
(absolute value t-statistics in parentheses)
Model
Output Union Cities!
Measures Total Cities (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ZI [73/213] .185 (1.4) .197 .013 .118(0.8) .106(0.7)
Z11 [83/252] .019 (0.3) .031 .001 .053 (0.8) .058 (0.8)
Z3 [83/255] .288 (1.7)** .399 .376 .394 (2.0)* .390 (2.0)*
Z i [84/256] - .048 (1.0) -. 004 .027 -. 016 (0.3) -. 015 (0.3)
Z5 [66/215] .002 (0.0) .042 .021 .032 (0.5) .039 (0.6)
Z, [82/251] .280 (1.6) .376 .395 .354 (1.7)** .346 (1.7)**
Z [83/252] -. 059 (0.9) .029 -. 028 -. 059 (0.8) -. 063 (0.8)
Z8 [65/211] -. 010 (0.2) -. 002 -. 033 -. 025 (0.3) -. 022 (0.3)
*Coefficient is significant at the .05 level in a two-tailed test.
**Coefficient is significant at the .10 level in a two-tailed test.
Legend:
Z, The number of information requests per capita.
Z,, The number of borrowers per capita.
Z The number of interlibrary loans per capita.
Z The total circulation per capita.
Z., Book and periodical circulation per capita.
Zf, The number of interlibrary loans per borrower.
Z 7 The total circulation per borrower.
Z8 Book circulation per borrower.
(1) OLS estimates for the entire sample, (0,1) union variable included (from Table 1).
(2) OLS estimates done separately for union and nonunion samples; union differential evaluated at the
mean values of the explanatory variables.
(3) Same as (2), except estimates have been corrected for selectivity bias.
(4) OLS estimates, sample of cities for which data on starting salaries for library clerical employees were
available, (0,1) union variable included.
(5) Same as (4), except the logarithm of clerical employees' wages has been included as an additional ex-
planatory variable.
ences only the intercept terms in the wage
and output equations; (2) estimating sepa-
rate equations for unionized and nonunion-
ized libraries; and then, on the basis of those
estimates, (3) evaluating the differentials
associated with collective bargaining at the
mean values of the explanatory variables in
the sample. These estimates suggest that
this modification does not substantially
alter any of the results. 19
So far in our analysis, whether any of a
library's employees are covered by a collec-
19The mean values of the explanatory variables
are quite similar in the union and nonunion sec-
tors. Hence, using the overall means in these cal-
culations will not lead to any serious index-number
problems. In other words, the estimates would not
differ very much if either the mean values in the union
sector or those in the nonunion sector were used.
tive bargaining agreement has been treated
as exogenously determined. It is not un-
reasonable to expect, however, that collec-
tive bargaining coverage will be a function
of both state laws governing public-em-
ployee unionization and the proportions of
public and private employees in a state who
are union members. The size of the library
is also likely to matter: large libraries may
be more bureaucratic in nature and more
conducive to unionization.20 Finally, collec-
tive bargaining coverage is likely to be re-
lated both to the estimated wage premium
associated with collective bargaining and
to the estimated productivity differential
20Guyton, Unionization: The View of Librarians,
pp. 126- 34.
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Table 4. Estimated Effects of Collective Bargaining Coverage
on the Logarithms of Library Employees' Annual Salaries.
(absolute value t-statistic in parentheses)
Salary Model
Measure Union Cities/Total Cities (1) (2) (3)
S, [79/236] .033 (0.7) .034 .081
S,, [79/228] -.016(0.3) -.005 .031
S, [55/183] .048 (0.8) .055 .020
Si [56/179] -. 034(0.6) -. 048 -. 078
Sr, [76/213] .078 (1.3) .072 .114
SI [74/206] .051 (0.8) .040 .080
S, [48/161] .037 (0.7) -. 076 -. 105
Ss [49/161] -. 015 (0.3) -. 119 -. 143
Legend:
S The starting salary for library professionals.
S,, The maximum salary for library professionals.
S11 The starling salary for library technicians.
SI The maximum salary for library technicians.
Sr, The starting salary for clerical employees.
S,; The maximum salary for clerical employees.
$, The starting salary for maintenance employees.
Ss The maximum salary for maintenance employees.
(I) OLS estimates for the entire sample, (0,1) variable included (from Table 2).
(2) OLS estimates done separately for union and nonunion samples, union differential evaluated at the
mean values of the explanatory variables.
(3) Same as (2) except estimates have been corrected for selectivity bias.
associated with collective bargaining-
the former because it influences both em-
ployees' demand for collective bargaining
coverage and library management's resis-
tance to it, the latter because the produc-
tivity effects associated with collective
bargaining also influence management's
resistance to it.
As is well known, estimates obtained
using ordinary least squares (OLS) tech-
niques with observed wage or productivity
data, such as those presented in Tables 1 and
2, may be subject to selectivity bias. In other
words, the estimates will be inconsistent if
the error terms in the wage or productivity
equations are correlated with whether the
library is covered by a collective bargaining
agreement. If libraries are not randomly
assigned to collective bargaining status, the
estimated coefficients of the wage or pro-
ductivity equations within a sector (union
or nonunion) may be capturing the effect of
an explanatory variable on whether the
library is covered by a collective bargaining
agreement, as well as the effect of the vari-
able on the outcome of interest (wages or
productivity). The problem is thus anala-
gous to an "omitted variable" problem,
where the omitted variable in the wage and
productivity equations is the probability
that a library is covered by a collective bar-
gaining agreement.
Fortunately, there is an econometric
technique that can resolve this problem.2'
2 1For the genesis of this approach, see James J.
Heckman, "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification
Error," Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 1 (January 1979),
pp. 153-61 and Lung-Fei Lee, "Unionism and
Wage Rates: A Simultaneous Equations Model With
Qualitative and Limited Dependent Variables,"
International Economic Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 (June
1978), pp. 415-33. A very readable discussion of
the selection bias problem is presented in Gregory
M. Duncan and Duane E. Leigh, "Wage Determina-
tion in the Union and Nonunion Sectors: A Sample
Selectivity Approach," Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, Vol. 34, No. 1 (October 1980), pp. 24- 34. An
appendix spelling out the details of this problem in
the context of this research is available from the au-
thors upon request.
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A reduced-form, probit equation, in which
library employees' wages and library output
are replaced by their determinants, can first
be estimated to determine the probability
that a library's employees are covered by a
collective bargaining agreement; the ex-
planatory variables in this equation should
include all those that directly influence
the probability of collective bargaining
coverage, as well as those that influence the
wage and productivity differentials associ-
ated with collective bargaining. From this
equation, one can compute estimates of
variables that are theh added to the pro-
ductivity and wage equations to control for
the probability that a library's employees are
covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Consistent parameter estimates can
then be obtained by estimating by OLS
techniques these "augmented" output and
wage equations; this can be done separately
for libraries that are covered by a collective
bargaining agreement and those that are
not. Finally, the estimated parameters and
the mean values of the explanatory variables
can be used to compute consistent estimates
of the union/nonunion output and wage
differentials.
Estimates of the reduced-form, probit
equation are displayed in Table 5. Column 1
includes only those variables that are ex-
pected to influence the probability of collec-
tive bargaining coverage directly, while
column 2 includes, in addition, those vari-
ables that enter the equation indirectly
through their postulated effects on the
union/nonunion wage and output differ-
entials. Quite strikingly, a number of the
former set of variables prove to be statisti-
cally significant. In particular, the proba-
bility of observing a library's employees
covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment is higher in states where local-govern-
ment employees are more heavily unionized
(V1 ), in states where mediation or fact-
finding services are provided by state agen-
cies to assist local-government bargaining
(V9 ), and in large cities (V0), whereas the
probability is lower in states where munici-
pal-employee strikes are illegal (V8).22
22We are grateful to our colleague John Burton for
providing us with the data he has collected on the
Table 5. Probit Estimates of the
Determinants of Collective Bargaining
Coverage for Library Employees.
(absolute value, asymptotic t-statistics
in parentheses )
Variable
C
VIviaV ,_,a
V
VI
V.,
V6
VI
V.a
V 10a
VIIV 12
VII
Via,V I-
V 18
V I_,
V,_q
V22a
Number of
Observations
Fraction
Organized
Log Likelihood
x
2
(1)
2.460 (3.7)*
- .712 (1.7)**
- .072 (1.6)
-. 008 (0.8)
.028 (1.6)
.023 (1.0)
- .437 (0.6)
.379 (1.0)
-. 943 (4.0)*
1.370 (3.0)*
.508 (3.1)*
260.0
.327
-110.8
107.0
(2)
1.820 (0.3)
-. 664 (1.5)
.004 (0.1)
-. 011 (1.1)
.032 (1.8)**
.029 (1.2)
-. 181 (0.2)
.387 (0.9)
- 1.250 (4.2)*
1.480 (2.8)*
.388 (1.8)*
-. 076 (0.3)
.224 ( 1.9)*
.037 (0.1)
-. 786 (0.6)
.838 (0.2)
-. 044 (1.3)
.071 (1.7)**
-. 025 (1.8)**
.002 (0.0)
-. 169 (0.9)
.043 (1.6)
-. 285 (0.0)
256.0
.328
- 102.6
118.9
a Coefficient has been multiplied by 100,000.
Legend:
V.1 The number of volumes in library.
V:i The percent of state government employ-
ees in the state that are union or employee
association members in 1977.
V I The percent of local government employ-
ees in the state that are union- or em-
ployee-association members in 1977.
V;, The percent of private employees in the
state that are union members in 1976.
Vf; l=library-employee bargaining is illegal
on some or all issues in the state as of 1977,
0=otherwise.
V7 l=municipal employers in the state are
required to "meet and confer" with their
employees as of 1977, O=otherwise.
V8 l=municipal employee strikes are pro-
hibited in the state as of 1977, 0=otherwise.
V, 1=mediation or factfinding provided in the
state for municipal employee bargaining as
of 1977, 0=oiherwise.
All other variables are defined as in Table 1.
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Armed with the probit estimates from
column 2, one can proceed as described
above to compute the estimated union/non-
union output and wage differentials for the
various measures; this is done in columns 3
of Tables 3 and 4, respectively. A compari-
son of columns 2 and 3 of each of these tables
suggests that although the probability of
collective bargaining coverage is endogen-
ously determined, selectivity bias does not
appear to be an important problem. In most
cases, the estimated differentials do not
appear to be sensitive to the correction for
selectivity bias; most are similar in magni-
tude to those reported in the previous col-
i1lnlus.
Finally, the estimates obtained so far of
the effects of collective bargaining on out-
put capture both the net effect of unions on
the production function for library services
and the effect of union-induced wage gains
on average costs and, hence, output. Al-
though the estimates in Table 4 suggest
that union-induced wage effects are in-
significant, no direct estimates of union
effects on the production function or on the
demand for library services have been ob-
tained. To do so would require including a
measure of library employees' wages in the
library output equation (see Equation 6).23
The wage measure we choose to use is the
starting salary for library clerical employees
(S,); this measure is available for a large
number of cities and is the only wage mea-
sure for which the union/nonunion differ-
ential is close to statistically significant
(Table 4).
Column 4 of Table 3 replicates the esti-
mated union/nonunion output differen-
tials reported in column 1 for a subsample of
cities for which the clerical wage variable
was available: the estimates are quite simi-
lar. Column 5 in Table 3 indicates the esti-
mated differentials when the clerical wage
is included as an additional explanatory
variable. As is evident, the inclusion of the
wage variable does not alter any of our con-
clusions. The only library output measure
characteristics of state bargaining laws covering
municipal employees in 1977.23See footnote 12 for an explanation of why wages
were initially excluded from the equation.
that is significantly associated with collec-
tive bargaining coverage is the number of
interlibrary loans.
Direct Estimates of Production Functions
Instead of focusing on the effect of collec-
tive bargaining coverage on observed out-
put, an effect determined by both demand
and cost considerations, one can focus di-
rectly on the underlying production process
for library services. For example, if the pro-
duction function in Equation 2 is Cobb-
Douglas, one can specify the following
equation:
(8) Q = A(I + Bu) L e K2,
where u equals one if the library is unionized
and zero if otherwise, and B represents the
proportionate productivity differential of
unionized libraries. B thus indicates the
proportion by which a unionized library's
output would exceed the output of an other-
wise identical nonunion library.
Equation 8 implies that:
(9) logQ=logA + a, logL
+ a, logK+Bu.
Hence, regressing the log of output on (1)
those demographic variables that affect
library productivity (variables that underlie
A, such as population density or city size),
(2) the logarithms of capital and labor, and
(3) a measure of whether the library is or-
ganized would enable one to estimate the
proportionate productivity advantage of
unionized libraries.24
The results of estimating Equation 9
with five measures of library output are
summarized in Table 6, which reports the
coefficient of the collective bargaining vari-
able for a number of different specifica-
tions.2 5 Rows I through 6 aggregate the vari-
ous occupational categories of library em-
ployees into a single measure by first assum-
24See Brown and Medoff, "Trade Unions in the
Production Process," for a similar approach applied to
the private sector.
"
5The number of libraries included in the analysis
reported in Table 6 is substantially smaller than those
reported in the previous tables because of the limited
number of libraries that reported the necessary em-
ployment data.
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Table 6. Estimated Effects of Collective Bargaining Coverage on the
Logarithms of Library Output Measures:
Cobb-Douglas Production Function Approach.
(absolute value t-statistics in parentheses)
Output Measures (sample sizes in brackets)
Model Q, [104] Q2 [107] Q [97] Q 4 [107] Q, [93]
(1) - .085 (0.8) .523 (2.0)* .181 (0.9) -. 065 (0.8) -. 095 (1.1)
(2) .552
(3) .549
(4) - .088 (0.8) .519 (2.0)* .176 (0.9) -.069 (0.8) -.098 (1.1)
(5) .553
(6) .550
(7) -. 128 (1.0) .841 (2.7)* .003 (0.0) -. 072 (0.8) -. 077 (0.9)
(8) - .127 (1.0) .842 (2.7)* .007 (0.0) - .070 (0.8) -. 075 (0.9)
*Coefficient is significant at the .05 level in a two-tailed test.
The number of borrowers.
The number of interlibrary loans.
The number of information requests.
The total circulation.
Book circulation.
Cobb-Douglas model with single labor input: the number of full-time-equivalent library profes-
sionals, which is computed by assuming that all categories of library employees have infinitely
elastic elasticities of substitution and then counting each part-time employee as one-half of a full-
time employee and weighting each category's employment by the mean (in the sample) ratio of its
starting salary to the starting salary of library professionals. The collective bargaining variable
shifts the intercept term.
Same as (1), but separate equations are estimated for the union and nonunion sectors, and the dif-
erential is then evaluated at the mean values (in the sample) of the explanatory variables.
Same as (2), except the estimates have been corrected for selectivity bias.
i),(6) Same as (1), (2), and (3), respectively, except maximum salaries rather than minimum salaries are
used to weight the different occupations.
8) Same as (1) and (4), respectively, but multiple labor inputs: professionals, library technicians,
clerical, and maintenance. Professionals were formed by aggregating head librarians, library pro-
fessionals, and other professionals in the manner described in (1). This assumes that the different
professional categories have elasticities of substitution that are infinite for each other, but that
across the four major occupational categories-professional, technician, maintenance, clerical-
the elasticity of substitution is unity.
ing that all categories have infinitely elastic
elasticities of substitution for one another,
and then weighting each category by its
mean (in the sample) relative salary and
counting each part-time employee as one-
half of a full-time employee. Rows 7 and 8
use a multiple labor-input generalization of
Equation 9; this allows the elasticity of sub-
stitution to be unity across aggregated cate-
gories but to be infinite across the detailed
occupational groups within a category.
Some of the models summarized in Table
6 allow the collective bargaining variable
to affect only the intercept term (as in Equa-
tion 9). Others estimate separate equations
for the union and nonunion sectors (allow-
ing all of the coefficients to vary with union
status) and then evaluate the union/non-
union differential at the mean of the explan-
atory variables in the sample. Finally, some
are estimated using the model that treats
collective bargaining coverage as endoge-
nous and corrects for selectivity bias, as
discussed in the previous section. In all
cases, the results are virtually identical to
those discussed in that section. Although
Legend
QI
QI
QIQ.,
(I)
(2)
(3)
(4),(5
(7).(8
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collective bargaining coverage is positively
associated with the number of interlibrary
loans, other things equal, neither the num-
ber of borrowers nor the library's circulation
of books and other materials is related to
collective bargaining coverage.2 6
The production-function approach to
estimating the effects of unions on produc-
tivity in the public sector is more direct
than the first approach described and thus
might seem to be preferable. Such an ap-
proach, however, requires the researcher to
have data on full-time and part-time em-
ployment levels of various categories of
public employees and to make assumptions
about the elasticities of substitution among
different labor inputs. As noted in Table 6,
the lack of the necessary employment data
reduced our sample sizes to roughly 100
observations when we used this approach.
Because of these problems, many research-
ers may find the indirect approach to be
preferable.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented two analytic
frameworks that can be used to analyze the
effects of collective bargaining on produc-
tivity in the public sector. The first involves
estimating reduced-form output equations,
based on a model of the equilibrium level of
public services in a community. The second
involves direct estimation of public sector
production functions. Both frameworks
2 6Two alternative specifications warrant mention
here. We relaxed the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas
technology and attempted to ascertain if collective
bargaining coverage affects the elasticity of sub-
stitution between capital and labor (using a CES
production function) or the elasticities of substitu-
tion among different categories of library employees
(using a translog cost function). Neither of these
alternative approaches indicated any significant rela-
tionships between collective bargaining coverage and
the elasticities of substitution. For a discussion of
how unionization affects elasticities of substitution in
the private sector, see Richard B. Freeman and James
L. Medoff, "Substitution Between Production Labor
and Other Inputs in Unionized and Nonunionized
Manufacturing," Review of Economics and Statistics,
Vol. 64, No. 2 (May 1982), pp. 220- 33.
allow for the treatment of collective bargain-
ing coverage as endogenous and for controls
for selectivity bias.
The frameworks were illustrated using
cross-section data for a sample of 256 muni-
cipal libraries in 1977. The estimates ob-
tained suggest that collective bargaining
coverage for library employees is not asso-
ciated with higher wage rates or with higher
(or lower) levels of library circulation and
borrowers. Both approaches do suggest,
however, that the number of interlibrary
loans is larger in unionized libraries. Since
this category of library output is not a major
one, collective bargaining coverage, on
balance, does not appear to affect sig-
nificantly library output or library em-
ployees' wages. Our estimates also suggest
that both the overall level of local-govern-
ment unionization in a state and the state's
laws governing collective bargaining in
local government are significant deter-
minants of whether any given muvi.c'ipal
library is organized.
Although output measures are often
difficult to quantify for other local-govern-
ment functions, our approaches, in prin-
ciple, can be implemented for a variety of
functions, including those in which public
sector unions might, a priori, be expected
to have larger effects (education, police,
firefighters, and sanitation, for example).
The approaches could also be extended by
using longitudinal data to ascertain the
extent to which changes in collective bar-
gaining status are associated with changes
in employee productivity. 7 Finally, with
suitable data on the provisions of collective
bargaining agreements, rather than data on
their mere existence, one could attempt to
trace the routes by which unions influence
productivity in the public sector; that is,
one could attempt to ascertain directly how
grievance resolution procedures, the role
of seniority in layoffs and promotions, and
restrictive work rules affect productivity.
2TSee Clark, "The Impact of Unionization on Pro-
ductivity: A Case Study," for an application of this
approach to the private sector.
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